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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 74 FALL 2000 NUMBER 4
ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS AND
SECURITY FOR COSTS AND FEES
JOHN A. GLIEDMAN*
Well before summary judgment motion practice, courts often
entertain motions as to whether security should be posted for
potential costs and attorney fees that may be awarded at the end
of the action.' Some courts have deemed a plaintiffs failure to
post such security to be grounds for dismissing the action,2 so the
consequences of such motions can be important indeed. It is also
important to note that courts decide the outcome of motions for
security before it is finally determined how much, or whether,
fees and costs will be awarded.3
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Rhonda Ebert and Drew Titus of Lexis Publishing for their frequent assistance. The
author also would like to thank his parents and other members of his family for
their encouragement.
1 See, e.g., Van Bui v. Children's Hosp., 178 F.R.D. 54, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(dismissing plaintiffs complaint for failure to file security for costs), affd, 178 F.3d
1278 (3d Cir. 1999); Selletti v. Carey, 173 F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing
whether plaintiffs inability to post security warrants dismissal); Johnson v.
Kassovitz, No. 97 Civ. 5789 (DLC), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15059, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 1998) (requiring plaintiff to file a $50,000 bond for potential costs);
Bressler v. Liebman, No. 96 Civ. 9310 (LAP), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11963, at *26
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1997) (ordering dismissal of plaintiffs action unless, within five
days, plaintiff files a $50,000 bond as security for defendants' fees and costs).
2 See Van Bui, 178 F.R.D. at 56; Bressler, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11963, at *26.
3 The terms "security for costs" and "cost bond" refer to a bond posted as
security for payment of a potential adverse award of costs, which may or may not
include attorney fees. Security for costs is the "[p]ayment into court in the form of
cash, property or bond by a plaintiff or an appellant to secure the payment of costs if
such person does not prevail." BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1357 (6th ed. 1990). A cost
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Many federal courts have enacted local rules4 authorizing
the imposition of security for costs and fees.5 While bonds as low
bond is "[a] bond given by a party to an action to secure the eventual payment of
such costs as may be awarded against him." Id. at 346. They are distinguishable
from supercedeas bonds, which are posted prior to appeal, and are defined as being
"required of one who petitions to set aside a judgment or execution and from which
the other party may be made whole if the action is unsuccessful"). See id. at 1438.
4 See, e.g., D. ALASKA ADM. R. 6 (providing that any party to a litigation can file
a demand for security for costs); D. ARIZ. R. 2.19(c) (security for costs may be
demanded from non-resident plaintiffs); E.D. ARK. and W.D. ARK. L.R. 4.2(b) ("The
Court, on motion or of its own initiative, may order any party plaintiff, either
resident or non-resident, to file an original bond for costs.... ."); C.D. CAL. L. CIV. R.
27A.2 (stating that the court, on motion or its own initiative, may order any party to
post security for costs); E.D. CAL. L. CIV. R. 65.1-151(b) (same); N.D. CAL. L. CIv. R.
65.1-1(a) (upon demand by a party, and for good cause shown, a party may be
required to post a security); S.D. CAL. L. CIV. R. 65.1.2(a) (same); D. CONN. L. CIv.
R. 8(a) (defendants, or plaintiffs if there is a counterclaim, are entitled, upon
request to the clerk, to an order for security); M.D. FLA. ADM. and MAR. R.
7.05(e)(2)-(3) (any party to an action may request security for costs); S.D. GA. ADM.
and MAR. L.R. 5(a) (providing for mandatory filing of security in certain maritime
claims); D. HAW. L.R. 65.1.1 ("The court, on motion or of its own initiative, may
order any party to file an original bond or additional security for costs.. ..");
BANKR. N.D. ILL. R. 419 ("Upon good cause shown, the court may order the filing of
a bond as security for costs"); E.D., M.D. and W.D. LA. L.R. 54.6 ("[Tihe court, on
motion or its own initiative, may order any party to file bond for costs.. . ."); E.D.,
M.D. and W.D. LA. L.R. 65.1.1 (delineating acceptable sureties for bonds furnished
in connection with a civil proceeding); D. ME. CIV. R. 54.1 (providing that a
defendant may request security for costs from a non-resident plaintiff); D. MD. Civ.
R. 103(4) (a non-resident plaintiff may be required to post a security for costs); D.
NEB. L.R. 67.1(f) ("The court on motion or on its own initiative may order any party
to file an original bond for costs ... ."); D.N.H. L.R. 67.1(a) ("[The court, either on
its own initiative or on the motion of a party, may order any party except the United
States to file an original bond for costs .... ."); D.N.J. L. ADM. and MAR. R. (e)(7)
("[A] party may move.., to compel an adverse party to post security for costs. ....);
E.D.N.Y. and S.D.N.Y. L.R. 54.2 ("The court on motion or on its own initiative, may
order any party to file an original bond for costs .... ."); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 67.3(e) (same);
W.D.N.C. L.R. 3.1(B) ("In both civil and criminal actions, bonds shall be allowed and
taken with security. ); N.D. OHIO L.R. 65.1.1(a) ('The Court, on motion or its
own initiative, may order any party to file an original bond .... "); E.D. OKLA. L.R.
65.1.1(B) ("[Tlhe court may at any time order any party to give security...."); N.D.
OKLA. L.R. 65.1.1(B) (same); D. OR. ADM. L.R. 1020-1 ("[Amny party may file and
serve upon an adverse party a demand for security for costs.. . ."); E.D. PA. Civ. R.
54.1(a) (an order for security for costs may be entered against a non-resident
plaintiff); W.D. PA. L.R. 67.1(A) (same); D.R.I. R. 25(a) (the court may order any
party to furnish security for costs); E.D. Wis. R. 3 § 3.01 (the court may order the
posting of security from any party); E.D. WIS. R. 22 § 22.05 (requiring filing security
for costs in admiralty and maritime claims).
5 Even in the absence of a local rule, courts have imposed security. See Hawes
v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir. 1976) ("Even in the
absence of a standing local rule, a federal district court has the inherent power to
require security for costs when warranted by the circumstances of the case.").
SECURITY FOR COSTS AND FEES
as a few hundred dollars have been required, courts have also
imposed bonds exceeding ten thousand dollars, particularly in
certain intellectual property cases where a prevailing party may
be awarded attorney fees pursuant to statute.6
Although the general concept of requiring security for fees
and costs has been adopted by courts over the years,
commentators have not addressed the subject. As we will see,
the requirement of cost bonds by federal courts, and the decision
to dismiss a case for failure to post such bonds, raise issues of
efficiency and basic fairness.
Is arranging for the satisfaction of a potential judgment of
costs and fees by requiring security a good thing? Does the value
of requiring security outweigh other considerations, and could
the process' goals be accomplished in a more satisfactory way?
For example, are non-resident litigants and resident litigants
treated equally? Is the practice of requiring security solely of
non-resident plaintiffs fair? Does equal protection require
altering or even eliminating the practice of requiring security
solely from non-resident plaintiffs?
Furthermore, upon a motion for security raised at the early
stages of a lawsuit, should a court consider the merits of the
underlying claims? In a number of cases, courts have made
fairly lengthy determinations regarding the likelihood that the
plaintiff will fail on the merits of the underlying claim and that,
consequently, an adverse judgment of costs or fees will arise.7
An issue arises as to whether debating the merits of the
underlying claim before the close of discovery is a sound practice.
Moreover, if it is a sound practice in the context of a motion for
security, then what standards of proof should apply?
This article presents the historical development of the
practice of requiring security for costs and attorney fees, and
6 See Selletti, 173 F.3d at 111 (holding that the requirement of a security bond
in the amount of $50,000 in an action brought in violation of the Copyright Act, was
"well within the district court's discretion"); Beverly Hills Design Studio (N.Y.) Inc.
v. Morris, 126 F.R.D. 33, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (requiring security for costs and
attorney fees in the amount of $20,000 in an action to recover damages for copyright
and trademark infringement); see also Anderson v. Steers, Sullivan, McNamar &
Rogers, 998 F.2d 495, 496 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming a $10,000 bond requirement in
an action brought to recover damages for trademark infringement and unfair
competition).
7 See Anderson, 998 F.2d at 496 (noting the apparent "frivolous character" of
plaintiffs claims); Beverly Hills Design Studio, 126 F.R.D. at 39 (noting that
"plaintiffs' federal claims seem to be of dubious merit").
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suggests the necessity of a method that promotes the satisfaction
of costs and fees and that is consistent and fair to all parties.
Part I examines the development of the law in this area. Part II
examines and critiques the procedures that some courts have
used to decide whether a litigant is obligated to post a cost bond.
Lastly, Part III maintains that authorizing federal courts to
extend their judicial reach beyond current jurisdictional limits
would obviate much of the need for security, while promoting the
satisfaction of awards of costs and attorney fees. In addition,
Part III suggests alternative methods of furthering the efficient
satisfaction of awards of costs and fees.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Security for Costs in England
Under early English law, a prevailing party could not
recover its litigation costs.8 In the late thirteenth century,
however, England enacted the Statute of Gloucester, 9 which
permitted the prevailing party in certain actions to recover
costs. 10  Under the English rule as to costs and fees, the
8 See 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 536-37 (3d ed.
1945) (commenting that the "amercement of the vanquished party was...
considered a sufficient punishment" at common law therefore costs were not
necessary); 2 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND
COMMON PLEAS 945 (9th ed. 1828) ("[N]o final costs were recoverable, by the
plaintiff or defendant, at common law."); 6 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL
ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 321-25 (2d ed. 1792) (discussing the evolution of
cost recovery under English law and the eventual inclusion of costs as an element of
damages through the passage of the Statute of Gloucester); see also Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (commenting that at
common law "costs were not allowed").
9 6 Edw. 1, c. 1 § 1 (1278), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 47
(1993).
10 See id. (providing for recovery of damages and costs in particular property
actions); 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 537 (noting the Statute of Gloucester
"laid down the rule that a plaintiff who recovered damages should always be
entitled to costs"); 2 TIDD, supra note 8, at 945 (explaining the Statute of Gloucester
extended to cases where damages were recoverable at common law or by the
provisions of the statute such as "covenant, debt on contract, case, trover, trespass,
assault and battery, replevin, ejectment [and] dower"); 6 VINER, supra note 8, at
321-33 (discussing the development of recovery of litigation costs in England and to
whom such costs are awarded under the Statute of Gloucester); see also
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967)
(commenting that "[als early as 1278, the courts of England were authorized to
award counsel fees ... ").
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prevailing party could recover litigation costs, including attorney
fees." Security for costs, however, did not become routine
practice until several centuries after the Statute of Gloucester. 12
Security bonds were considered ill advised because they were
viewed as an unfair barrier to trade and to the courts.13 By the
late eighteenth century other European courts were requiring
security for costs. 14 In light of this development, English judges
thought it would be appropriate to require foreign plaintiffs,
including those from Ireland and Scotland, to post security.15
11 See Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 856 (1929) ("It is common
understanding in America that the difference between the American and the
English rules as to costs lies in the fact that under the English system the
successful party may recover the charges he has to pay his own lawyer."); see also
Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 717 n.7 ("'This statute ... was from the outset liberally
construed to encompass all legal costs of suit.... ").
12 See, e.g., Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 11 (Eng.) (stating that security
may be required); Land Registry Act, 1862, 9 § 10 Vict., c. 53, § 44 (Eng.) (providing
that a court may require applicants to give security); see also 1 WILLIAM TIDD,
PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS 61-62 (1793).
13 See 1 TIDD, supra note 12 at 61-62; see also Nuncomar v. Burdett, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1020 (KB. 1774) (refusing to stay an action until security is given for costs,
even though the plaintiff'resided in the East Indies noting "[iut is every day refused.
I have many notes of its being so"); Golding v. Barlow, 98 Eng. Rep. 948 (KB. 1774)
("Lord Mansfield said, that the Court would not do it in the case of a foreigner's
being a plaintiff; nor in matters of property, except in ejectment, where the lessor of
the plaintiff is an infant."); Bosewell v. Irish, 98 Eng. Rep. 98 (KB. 1767) (denying a
defendant's motion seeking to impose security for costs upon a non-resident plaintiff
and stating that such motions were altogether "contrary to rule" and "clogging the
course of justice"); Lamii v. Sewell, 95 Eng. Rep. 610 (KB. 1750) (denying a
defendant's motion to compel a non-resident plaintiff to post a security for costs, or a
stay of proceedings until security is posted, "because it would affect trade, and be
excluding foreigners from obtaining justice in our Courts"); Cowell v. Taylor, 31 L.R.
34, 38 (Ch. App. 1885) (holding that there is no requirement of security for costs
from a bankrupt trustee because poverty should not bar a litigant from the courts).
14 See 1 TIDD, supra note 12 at 61-62; Fitzgerald v. Whitmore, 99 Eng. Rep.
1140 (KB. 1786) (noting that English residents were required to give security for
costs when pursuing claims in European countries); see also Burkhard Bastuck &
Burkhard Gopfert, Admission and Presentation of Evidence in Germany, 16 LOY
L.A. IN'TL & COMP. L.J. 609, 627 (1994).
15 See Fitzgerald, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1140.
[T]he reason why such a rule had lately been adopted, contrary to
the former determinations, in the case of foreigners, was, because
English subjects who sued in most of the foreign countries in
Europe were under a similar necessity of giving security for
costs .... [Tihe same reason which induced the court to lay down
the rule with respect to foreigners, namely, because the process of
our courts would not reach them in case an execution issued for
the costs, held equally with respect to Irishmen.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The practice of requiring foreign plaintiffs to post security
for costs must be viewed against the background of the courts'
limited power to require foreigners to appear before them, e.g.,
the development of limited in rem jurisdiction. 16 At common law,
a judgment was often regarded as the grounds to levy an
execution against a party's person or land. The party's presence
within the jurisdiction of the court was a key element to the
enforcement of a judgment.17 Because the courts' jurisdiction
was limited to property within England, the purpose of a bond
was to secure payment of potential costs from non-English
litigants.'8  Courts routinely stayed proceedings until the
plaintiff posted a bond.19 Security was not required, however, in
circumstances where a party could not afford to post a bond.20
B. Development of Security in the United States
In the early years of the United States, a number of
jurisdictions required security for costs, continuing the English
practice.21  Courts required security bonds to ensure that
prevailing defendants could recover costs from non-resident
16 See Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612-13 (D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134)
(explaining that although a party may not be personally bound to a judgment if he
is not within the territory, if his property is within such territory the judgment will
bind him to the extent of the value of the property).
17 See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1070 (2d ed. 1987) (explaining that physical power over a defendant
or its property is a prerequisite to a judgment's validity); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 734 (1877) (ruling a personal judgment against a non-resident party invalid);
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 U.S. 404, 406 (1855) (stating that defendant must
be personally within the jurisdiction of the state, or have legal notice of the suit, for
the judgment against him to be valid).
Is See Fitzgerald, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1140 (noting that process of the English
courts could not reach foreign litigants to secure costs).
19 See id. (staying further proceedings until the plaintiff, a resident of Ireland,
gives security for costs); see also 1 EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, PLEADING AND
PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 28 (6th ed. 1894) (noting the English
rule that if the plaintiff "is resident abroad, the Court will, on the application of the
defendant.., order [the plaintiff] to give security ... and in the mean time direct
all proceedings to be stayed").
20 See Goodhart, supra note 11, at 875 ("[Ihe English Rules of Court are
specific that security shall never be required in the court of first instance on the
ground of the plaintiffs poverty."); 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 538 (explaining
poor persons should be entitled to access to the courts regardless of their ability to
pay costs).
21 See, e.g., McEwen v. Gibbs, 4 Dall. 137, 137 (Pa. 1794) (requiring security for
costs from a "certified bankrupt" plaintiff); Shaw v. Wallace, 2 Dall. 179, 179-80
(Pa. 1792) (requiring security for costs from a New York plaintiff).
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plaintiffs at the conclusion of an action.22 "Costs" included
attorney fees only where specified by statute or by prior
agreement between the parties.2
The courts' power to compel non-residents to appear before
them is analogous to the limited reach of national courts over
individuals residing overseas. 24  It is this territorial-based
concept of jurisdiction that the United States Supreme Court
adopted in Pennoyer v. Neff.25 In Pennoyer, the Court was
confronted with the issue of the effect of a default judgment
against an out-of-state defendant. The Court held that a state
could not exercise process, and thereby exert jurisdiction, over a
person or property beyond its territory.26 Writing for the
majority, Justice Field stated that "no tribunal established by [a
state] can extend its process beyond that territory so as to
subject either persons or property to its decisions."27  The
22 See 1 DANIELL, supra note 19, at 27-28 ("In order... to prevent the
defendant or respondent... from being defeated of his right to costs, it is a rule,
that if the plaintiff.., is resident abroad, the Court will.., order him to give
security.... "); see also Canadian N. Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 561 (1920)
(commenting that "security for costs has very generally been required of a non-
resident, but not of a resident").
23 In England, costs were highly regulated by law and included not only fees for
ministerial items such as clerks' fees, but also, attorney fees. On the other hand, in
the United States the situation was different. In the states' courts, a prevailing
party could recover costs, which were often regulated by statute. See John
Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 12-14 (1984) (reviewing the history of the English and
American rules regarding attorney fees collection). The United States Supreme
Court held, however, that attorney fees were not ordinarily recoverable costs. See
Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306 (Pa. 1796) (noting that it was the general practice
of the courts of the United States to deny recovery of attorney fees). While the
practice of attorney fees regulation continued in the early years of the United
States, the scale of taxable attorney fees did not increase with inflation and, over
time, regulation of attorney fees ended. See Leubsdorf, supra, at 12-14.
24 See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1064, at 229 (noting that courts in
the United States "adopted the territorial principle of jurisdiction.., by viewing
sister states as foreign nations for jurisdictional purposes and imposing geographic
limitations on the exercise of judicial jurisdiction"); see also Picquet v. Swan, 19 F.
Cas. 609, 612-13 (D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134) (noting the jurisdictional limitations
of the courts).
25 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
26 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734 ("It follows.., that the personal judgment
recovered in the... court... against the plaintiff... then a non-resident of the
State, was without any validity...."). The Court explained that defendant's
property outside the state did not give rise to personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. See id.
27 Id. at 722.
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principle that state and federal courts may not extend their
process beyond a limited territorial area has prevailed. 28
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY IN FEDERAL PRACTICE
A. Security in the Federal System
Prior to enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938,29 the Conformity Act of 187230 required federal district
courts to apply state law in various procedural matters.31 Thus,
the Act obligated courts to apply state law in determining
whether to require security for costs. 32 With the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, district courts
were permitted to adopt their own local rules of practice
in the absence of an applicable conflicting Federal Rule.33
28 Of course, Pennoyer had other wide-ranging implications for jurisdiction in
the federal courts, including the early twentieth century doctrine that, in the
absence of a waiver, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is restricted to instances
when the defendant is present within the state. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
17, § 1064, at 229 (noting the historical rule that a person was not be subject to a
court's jurisdiction unless actually served with process within a court's territorial
jurisdiction or consented to the court's jurisdiction). This territorial-based doctrine
of personal jurisdiction was effectively eliminated by International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny.
29 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (authorizing the
Supreme Court of the United States to prescribe rules in civil actions at law for the
district courts and for the courts of the District of Columbia). These rules, known as
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, went into effect on September 16, 1938.
30 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196 (1872) (superseded) [hereinafter
Conformity Act] (delineating when state law should apply in federal actions).
31 See generally 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §2
App.101[2] (3d ed. 2000) (explaining that the Conformity Act, which required
district courts to apply state law, remained unchanged and in effect until it was
superceded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938); Stapleton v. Reading
Co., 26 F.2d 242, 243 (3d Cir. 1928) (holding that the Conformity Act mandates that
the proceedings in federal court should conform to the practice of proceedings in the
courts of the state where district court is located).
32 See Green v. Me-Tex Supply Co., 29 F. Supp. 851, 851-52 (S.D. Tex. 1939)
(noting that while the Conformity Act was in force, Texas state law governed the
rules for costs).
33 See FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (stating district courts may make and amend rules
governing their practice as long as the local rule is consistent with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); Green, 29 F. Supp. at 852 (noting that the absence of an
applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure permits the application of local court
rules); Cavicchi v. Mohawk Mfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 981, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (noting
the local court rule provided that in the absence of a federal rule or local court rule
the court looks to the "procedure which shall then prevail in the Supreme Court of
the State of New York"); see generally 1 MOORE, supra note 31, § 83 (discussing Rule
SECURITY FOR COSTS AND FEES
Accordingly, the federal courts enacted local rules providing for
security for costs. 34
We have seen that the general concept of security for costs
or fees is well established. A court should be able to arrange for
its ability to enforce awards of costs or fees. But as discussed
below, the actual practices of choosing when to require security
and dismissing a case because of the failure to post security,
raise fairness issues for federal courts. These issues are similar
to the concerns of the English courts that also hesitated to
require security. In particular, is a bond based on non-residence
fair?. If not, should other factors be considered, and if so, in what
manner?
B. Federal Practice of Requiring Security
1. Development of Criteria for Requiring Security
In the 1950s and 1960s, courts began to tentatively address
the complex issues surrounding security for costs. Addressing a
trial order for bond for costs, the Second Circuit held that
"[t]here does not seem justification for a court of the United
States to put an arbitrary and unbending clog on suits by one of
its own citizens merely because he does not have the good
fortune to live in New York."35 Some courts, citing to the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution,36 have
implied or stated that requiring a bond solely based on the
residence of a litigant is unconstitutional, but this view has not
been adopted or elaborated upon to a great degree.37
83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the manner in which a local district
court may enact rules). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted pursuant
to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which grants the Supreme Court of the United
States "the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure" for the
federal court system. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994). The statute further provides that
"[aill laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force." 28 U.S.C. §
2072(b).
34 See supra note 4 (identifying local court rules of federal district courts that
provide for the posting of security for costs).
35 Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 285 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1960).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37 See, e.g., Aggarwal v. Ponce Sch. of Med., 745 F.2d 723, 727 (1st Cir. 1984)
(discussing the equal protection challenge to the non-resident bond requirement);
Coady v. Aguadilla Terminal Inc., 456 F.2d 677, 679 (1st Cir. 1972) (stating that
"[tlo require all foreign plaintiffs ... to post substantial security as a condition to
access to the courts may well be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection");
Cleveland v. Wilken, 917 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Fl. 1996) (challenging the
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2. Factors Considered by the Courts Under a Multi-Factored
Approach
In 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit synthesized relevant factors considered by courts in
determining whether security for costs should be imposed.38 The
First Circuit enumerated the following factors: "[O]wnership by
a non-domiciliary plaintiff of attachable property in the district,
the likelihood of success on the merits, the presence of a co-
plaintiff who is domiciled in the district, the probable length and
complexity of the litigation, the conduct of the litigants, and the
purposes of the litigation. '3 9
constitutionality of a state statute imposing a bond requirement for non-resident
plaintiffs). See also, Sittig v. Tallahasse Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., 567 So. 2d 486 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (commenting on the district court's holding that the "statutory
bond requirement effectively operated to preclude [plaintiff] from exercising her
state constitutional right"); Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1377
(Alaska 1988) (analyzing the requirement of non-resident security bond on equal
protection grounds). While some courts have suggested that a residency
requirement violates the Constitution, a number of district courts in the Southern
District of New York have ignored the Farmer holding and have held that the
mandatory requirement for cost bonds for non-residents imposed by N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
8501 (McKinney 1998) should be followed by the federal courts sitting in New York
State. See, e.g., Fertilizantes Fosfatados Mexicanos, S.A. v. C.Y. Chen, Chem.
Carriers, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 2048 (MJL), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12277, at *18-19
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1992) (requiring both plaintiff and defendant to post security
pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 8501); Ilro Prods., Ltd. v. Music Fair Enters., 94
F.R.D. 76, 81-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 8501 is an
important public policy statement of New York's legislature to ensure payment of
costs and, therefore, should apply to a motion for security for costs). But see Atlanta
Shipping Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 818 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that "[i]n
diversity actions, federal courts are not bound to follow state rules on security for
costs where a federal local rule granting discretion is applicable, although they may
look to state rules for guidance") (quotations and citations omitted).
38 See Hawes v. Club Ecuestre el Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 144 (1st Cir. 1976)
(noting that under appropriate circumstances a court has the inherent authority to
require security for costs, and discussing the relevant factors to be considered in
deciding whether to require security). Two cases decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the late 1950s and 1960s indicated that cost
bonds could be required as a matter of the court's discretion, and declared that cost
bonds could be required in instances where prior litigation involving the same party
suggests that an award of costs is likely. See Leighton v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
340 F.2d 859, 861 (2d Cir. 1965) (noting that because the plaintiff "was an habitual
pro se litigant whose claims were often conclusory and lacking in legal merit" it was
reasonable to require plaintiff to post a modest amount of security); Miller v. Town
of Suffield, 249 F.2d 16, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1957) (justifying security for costs on the
grounds that the plaintiffs "vague charges.., have always lacked substance and
substantiation").
39 Hawes, 535 F.2d at 144. Interestingly, the plaintiffs prior litigation efforts,
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and the district courts in the Second Circuit have discussed
similar multi-factored criteria.40 Appellate courts in the First,
Second, and Ninth circuits have reviewed the application of
these factors under an abuse of discretion standard.
41
The use of various factors in deciding whether security for
costs is warranted has left the law somewhat unsettled. What
follows is a discussion of the development of the case law
regarding this multi-factored approach.
a. Ownership ofAttachable Property Within the Forum
Cases touching on the issue of security for costs typically
focus on plaintiffs domiciled outside of the forum jurisdiction
who are without attachable assets to satisfy a potential award of
costs and fees.42 But the precise type of proof necessary to
considered in Miller and Leighton, expanded to include consideration of the
underlying merits of the plaintiffs case.
40 See Simulnet E. Assocs. v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 37 F.3d 573, 576
(9th Cir. 1994) (adopting factors discussed in Aggarwal v. Ponce School of Medicine,
745 F.2d 723, 727-28 (1st Cir. 1984)). The factors include:
(i) the degree of probability/improbability of success on the merits, and the
background and purpose of the suit; (ii) the reasonable extent of the
security to be posted, if any, viewed from the defendant's perspective; and
(iii) the reasonable extent of the security to be posted, if any, viewed from
the nondomicilliary plaintiffs perspective
Aggarwal, 745 F.2d at 727-28; see also Selletti v. Carey, 173 F.R.D. 96, 100-01
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (listing generally considered factors such as: "the financial condition
and ability to pay of the party at issue; whether that party is a non-resident or
foreign corporation; the merits of the underlying claims; the extent and scope of
discovery; the legal costs expected to be incurred; and compliance with past court
orders"); Herbstein v. Bruetman, 141 F.R.D. 246, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (listing such
criteria as: (1) whether the litigant has the ability to pay costs; (2) whether the
litigant is present within the United States; (3) whether there is merit to the
litigant's underlying claims; (4) the extent and scope of discovery; and (5) whether
the litigant has complied with the court's past orders).
41 See Simulnet, 37 F.3d at 574 ("We review for abuse of discretion the district
court's order requiring security for fees and costs."); Atlanta Shipping Corp., 818
F.2d at 252 (holding that the lower court judge "acted within his discretion" in
requiring the plaintiff to post a security bond); Montserrat Overseas Holdings, S.A.
v. Larsen, 709 F.2d 22, 24 (9th. Cir. 1983) ("It cannot be said that requiring a bond
to be posted... constituted abuse of discretion."); Hawes, 535 F.2d at 143-44
(regarding security for costs, "the [trial] court is vested with a large measure of
discretion in applying such rules").
42 See, e.g., Beverly Hills Design Studio (N.Y.) Inc. v. Morris, 126 F.R.D. 33, 39
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (ordering a $20,000 bond where the plaintiff could not identify
assets that could satisfy a potential award of costs and fees); Oilex A.G. v. Mitsui &
Co. (U.S.A.), 669 F. Supp. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (ordering the plaintiff, out of
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establish that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy an award of
costs and fees is not always clear.43 Indeed, appellate courts
generally have not set clear standards as to how a court should
proceed when the plaintiff lacks assets or credit to post a bond
for costs and fees. Some appellate courts have stressed that the
financial ability of the party to post a bond must be considered, 44
and, upon considering a plaintiffs income status, have waived
the imposition of fees and costs and the requirement of posting a
business or lacking assets, to post a $25,000 bond); Knight v. Yerkes and Assocs.,
Inc., 675 F. Supp. 139, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (requiring security for costs after finding
that the property of the plaintiff, a resident of Thailand, has already been the
subject of attachment proceedings in another action); Atlanta Shipping Corp. v.
Chem. Bank, 631 F. Supp. 335, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 818 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.
1987) (ordering the plaintiff, a Liberian corporation and a debtor in bankruptcy
without reachable assets, to post a $10,000 bond in its action to recover unpaid
judgments); A. and R. Theatre Corp. v. Azteca Films, Inc. 32 F.R.D. 47, 48 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (explaining that although security for costs is not ordinarily required from a
domestic corporation, security is warranted because, among other things, the
plaintiffs have been dissolved by the State of New York for non-payment of
franchise taxes). But see Acom Computer Sys. Ltd. v. Hilton -Intl Co., No. 88 Civ.
8474 (JMW), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11498, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1989) ("The
mere fact that [plaintiff] is a foreign corporation does not warrant the imposition of
a bond. [Defendant] must convince this court that additional factors...
demonstrate that [defendant] would be unable to recover costs from [plaintiff]
should [defendant] prevail."); Shepherd Agency, Inc. v. Mansfield Bldg. Sys., Inc.,
No. 85 Civ. 0971 (CSH), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7220, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. July 13,
1988) (noting that the plaintiffs "claims of solvency and plaintiffs presence in the
United States distinguish this case from the more typical case where courts have
required foreign plaintiffs or debtors known to be in bankruptcy to post security for
costs"); Canning v. Star Pubrg Co., 130 F. Supp. 697, 699 (D. Del. 1955) (explaining
that although the plaintiff was a non-resident of the district, there where no
"extraordinary circumstances" present to warrant a bond); Newell v. O.A. Newton &
Son Co., 95 F. Supp. 355, 360 (D. Del. 1950) (declining to require a bond despite the
plaintiffs status of a non-resident of the district).
43 See generally Beverly Hills Design Studio, 126 F.R.D. at 36 (noting that
"[clases requiring a security bond generally involve plaintiffs with no reachable
assets") (emphasis added).
44 See, e.g., Selletti v. Carey, 173 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
district court abused its discretion by dismissing the plaintiffs action for failure to
comply with an order to post a security for costs without "accord[ing] any significant
weight to plaintiffs inability to... post security"); Aggarwal, 745 F.2d at 728
(stating that upon deciding whether to dismiss a suit due to the plaintiffs failure to
comply with an order for security, "a plaintiffs ability to post security for costs must
weigh in the balance"); cf. Hornbuckle v. Arco Oil & Gas Co., 732 F.2d 1233, 1237
(5th Cir. 1984) (noting that a finding of fact as to the ability to pay sanctions for
failure to proceed with trial on a scheduled date is "essential" for appellate
consideration of whether dismissal for failure to pay the sanctions was an abuse of
discretion).
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bond.45 Other courts, however, have taken the exact opposite
approach, concluding that the circumstances of a plaintiffs
financial shortcomings justify the need for security for costs and
fees.46 Still other courts have required a bond, but only after
concluding that the amount of the bond would not seriously
impede the plaintiffs ability to prosecute the action.47
b. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Some courts have found that a plaintiffs likelihood of
success on the merits is worth considering with respect to a
motion for security for costs. 48 Courts, however, have not set
formal thresholds of proof when considering the merits of an
action in such circumstances. 49 In addition, courts have not
addressed the situation that arises when, in the early stages of
45 See, e.g., Carobo-Gardner v. Diners Club, 628 F. Supp. 1253, 1255 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (noting that the court considers the pro se plaintiffs economic status when
deciding whether to waive court fees and costs); Gift Stars, Inc. v. Alexander, 245 F.
Supp. 697, 700-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding that an indigent party need not post a
security bond).
46 See, e.g., Beverly Hills Design Studio, 126 F.R.D. at 36 (requiring a bond
because the plaintiff did not identify any assets which could satisfy an award of
costs); Tri-Ex Enters., Inc. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., No. 80 Civ. 3856
(WCC), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23502, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1985) (observing that
the plaintiff "argue[d], with no small degree of irony, that the motion should be
denied precisely because it has no funds with which to post a bond. The Court finds
little merit in this self-defeating argument").
47 See, e.g., Mann v. Levy, 776 F. Supp. 808, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[The amount
of the bond should not 'seriously impede' plaintiffs ability to prosecute the action.");
Atlanta Shipping, 631 F. Supp. at 353 ("The [bond] requirement should not...
impede [the plaintiffs] ability to prosecute this action."); Leslie One-Stop In Pa. Inc.
v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 33 F.R.D. 16, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ("I cannot believe that
[posting a security bond] will make it impossible for plaintiff to continue its
action....").
48 See, e.g., Johnson v. Kassovitz , No. 97 Civ. 5789 (DLC), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15059, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1998) (justifying the imposition of a security
for costs on, among other things, the plaintiffs failure to "challenge in writing [the
defendants'] contentions that her case is without merit"); Selletti, 173 F.R.D. at
100-01 (stating that one of the factors to be considered in a motion for a bond for
costs is the merits of the underlying claim); Herbstein v. Bruetman, 141 F.R.D. 246,
247 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating same).
49 See, e.g., Jernryd v. Nilsson, No. 84 PV. 7551, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11985,
at *5 (N.D. Mll. Oct. 20, 1988) (noting, loosely, "that there appears to be a factual
basis for the [plaintiffs] claim," and concluding that "[a] security bond is not
warranted on the grounds that the action lacks merit"); Vesco & Co., Inc. v.
Hannoch, Weisman, Stern & Besser, No. 78 Civ. 4667 (RWS), 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12009, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 1, 1979) (granting defendant's motion to require
plaintiff to post a bond but observing, without discussion, that "it cannot be said
from reading the papers that this action is completely without merit").
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the litigation, there is an insufficient record to determine
whether a case lacks merit.50 Similarly, it is not clear which
party on a motion for security bears the burden of proof
regarding the merits of the claim.
Some district courts have refused to consider the likelihood
of success on the merits in the calculus of whether a bond should
be required.51 Courts often hold that a bond is required even
though the case may survive a motion to dismiss for plaintiffs
failure to state a cognizable cause of action.52 In Thompson v.
Avco Corp.,53 the district court held that even though the
plaintiffs amended complaint withstood dismissal for failure to
state a claim, a $10,000 bond was appropriate because the
amended complaint was "not in all the circumstances a likely
harbinger of ultimate success."54 In Fisch v. Fidelcor Business
Credit Corp.,55 the district court granted the defendant's motion
for an order requiring the plaintiffs to post a $10,000 bond for
costs, stating that "there appears to be unusually serious
problems with the merits of plaintiffs' case" because the plaintiff
initially refused to comply with deposition requests.56
c. The Conduct of the Litigants and Purposes of the Litigation
There are two categories of cases where the conduct of one of
the parties indicates bad faith justifying a requirement that such
50 See, e.g., Selletti, 173 F.R.D. at 100-01 (citing local rule and district court
case law when describing the factors considered in a motion to post bond); Bressler
v. Liebman, No. 96 Civ. 9310 (LAP), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
14, 1997).
51 See, e.g., Jernryd, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11985, at *4-5 (regarding the
merits of the claim, the court stated that "fait this stage of the litigation the court is
not in a position to make any factual findings"); Atlanta Shipping, 631 F. Supp. at
353 n.25 ("The plaintiff asks us to make a preliminary determination on the merits
in order to decide whether to require costs. At this stage, that determination is
neither possible nor necessary.").
52 See Thompson v. Avco Corp., No. 74 Civ. 731 (M.E.F.), 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14578, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1975) (holding that although the suit
withstands dismissal, New York law mandates that a non-resident post security for
costs); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (denying
defendants' motion for summary judgment, but requiring, pursuant to state law,
plaintiff to give security for reasonable expenses and attorney fees).
53 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14578, at *1.
54 Id. at *11.
55 No. 91 Civ. 5047 (TPG), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3419, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23,
1994).
56 See id. at *5 (holding that the plaintiff was required "to post a bond or other
security... as a condition for proceeding further with this action").
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party post a bond as a condition of continuing to litigate. The
first category involves cases where the litigant had repeatedly
advanced similar claims that were previously dismissed.57
Similarly, a substantial bond may be required when the court
determines that it likely will award attorney fees based on the
plaintiffs demonstrated bad faith in pursuing the action.58 In
Bressler v. Liebman,5 9 a substantial bond was required after the
court observed that the plaintiff's claims were previously
rejected in state court.60  In addition, the court noted the
plaintiffs misrepresentation of the judge's statements as another
example of the plaintiffs bad faith and as further grounds for
imposing a substantial bond to secure the defendant's ability to
recover attorney fees.6
1
The second category of cases involves misconduct in
disobeying court orders.62  In Argonaut Insurance Co. v.
57 See Miller v. Town of Suffield, 249 F.2d 16, 16 (2d Cir. 1957) (noting
plaintiffs history of pursuing "vague charges ... lack[ing] substance and
substantiation" against defendants); Klein v. Spear, Leeds, & Kellogg, 306 F. Supp.
743, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing plaintiffs "litigious nature" as justification for
requiring security for costs).
58 See Bressler v. Liebman, No. 96 Civ. 9310 (LAP), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11963, at *20-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing instances of the plaintiffs bad faith
leading to the imposition of a security bond including attorney fees); Tri-Star
Pictures, Inc. v. Kurt Unger, 32 F. Supp. 2d 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("It is also
proper to require the posting of a bond... when a party has engaged in a course of
'vexatious' conduct throughout a litigation."); Haberman v. Tobin, No. 74 Civ. 5740
(RWS), 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11358, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1981) (holding that posting
of a bond is necessary to protect the defendant "based on the general history of
[plaintiffs] conduct throughout this litigation" which was characterized by the court
as "vexatious").
59 No. 96 Civ. 9310 (LAP) 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11963, at *1.
60 See id. at *21 (noting the prior rejection of plaintiffs claims as an example of
plaintiffs bad faith litigation).
61 See id. at *22 (explaining that "willful misrepresentation [of a judge's
comments] is the very essence of bad faith").
62 See, e.g., Selletti v. Carey, 173 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) (justifying a
security bond when the plaintiff violated the court's discovery orders); Haberman,
626 F.2d at 1101 (dismissing action of plaintiff who repeatedly disregarded orders
from the court); Herbstein v. Bruetman, 141 F.R.D. 246, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(stating that, as a result of the defendants' failure to comply with court orders and
the existence of a prior default judgment against the defendants, it was appropriate
to require the defendants to a post security for costs of defending against a motion
for summary judgment); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Goepfert, No. 76 Civ. 802 (CHT), 1980
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13284, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1980) (citing the dilatory tactics
engaged in by the third-party plaintiffs as one of the grounds for requiring security
for costs).
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Goepfert,63 the court required the defendant to post a bond,
noting that the defendant had "procrastinated and engaged in
dilatory tactics."64 In Selletti v. Carey,65 the court found that a
plaintiff, with only $500 in identifiable assets, offered virtually
no evidence to support his copyright claim.66 In addition, the
court found that the plaintiff violated the district court's
discovery orders and provided information to the media that he
withheld from discovery.67 The court held that, under these
circumstances, requiring the plaintiff to post a bond was
warranted. In requiring the defendant to post security, the
district court stated: "[ilt is difficult to understand why [the
plaintiff] would not have pursued this case more aggressively
and produced in discovery, as required both by the Federal Rules
and my orders, the evidence he contends supports his claims, if
he actually had a good faith belief in the validity of those
claims."68
d. The Probable Length and Complexity of the Litigation
Security for costs may range from a few hundred dollars to
ten thousand dollars or more, depending on the court's opinion
regarding specific litigation expenses. 69  In contemplating
litigation expense, courts consider such factors as the extent of
discovery, the general complexity of the litigation, and whether
the litigation will involve extensive travel.70
63 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13284, at *1.
64 See id. at *15.
65 173 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1999).
66 See id. at 111 (observing that the district court found the merits of the
plaintiffs case to be questionable, and that the defendant's ability to recover costs,
which might be awarded, was in doubt).
67 See id. at 106 (indicating that the plaintiff was actively seeking publicity
about his lawsuit).
68 Selletti v. Carey, 173 F.R.D. 96, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
69 See, e.g., Lawford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 906, 920 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (noting defendants' contention that there will be a need to conduct discovery
in Canada, and imposing a $15,000 bond for costs); Knight v. H.E. Yerkes & Assoc.,
Inc., 675 F. Supp. 139, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (concluding that "[iun light of the
substantial number of depositions that will likely take place and the location of
some of those depositions... defendant will incur substantial costs," and ordering
plaintiff to file a bond in the amount of $15,000); Haberman v. Tobin, 466 F. Supp.
447, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (imposing a $100,000 bond in light of "the magnitude of
this case").
70 See Fisch v. Fidelcor Bus. Credit Corp., No. 91 Civ. 5047 (TPG), 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3419, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1994) ("[Tlhe multi-million dollar
demand for damages, together with the nature of the issues, requires defendant to
968 [Vol.74:953
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3. Cost Bonds and Attorney Fees
Costs typically include outlays for litigation expenses such
as "the stenographic costs of the depositions, witness fees,
notarial certificates, and postage, as well as the costs of
preparing maps, charts, graphs, financial summaries and
surveys, and drawings."71 The amount of the bond, however, can
rise dramatically when the party seeking the bond may be
entitled to attorney fees as provided in a statute or in a prior
agreement between the parties.7 2 For example, the Copyright
Act 7 3 provides for the recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing
party.74 In copyright cases, courts have required plaintiffs to
post substantial bonds, including attorney fees.75
engage in extensive discovery in order to defend the case .... [Therefore], the court
decides that plaintiffs should be required to post a bond or other security in the
amount of $10,000...."); Oilex A.G. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), 669 F. Supp. 85, 88
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (explaining that costs would include extensive discovery in foreign
countries, and the need to translate evidence into English; ordering plaintiff to post
security in the amount of $25,000); Knight, 675 F. Supp. at 142 (noting the
substantial number of depositions that will likely take place); Burke v. Central-rll.
Sec. Corp., 9 F.RD. 426, 430 (D. Del. 1949) ("[I]ncreased costs involved in discovery
procedure, depositions and other matters may increase the usual former amount of
cost bonds if the original purpose of such bonds, viz., actual security for costs, is to
be preserved.").
71 Jernryd v. Nilsson, No. 84 Civ. 7551, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11985, at *7
(N.D. 11. Oct. 20, 1988) (citing Soo Hardwoods, Inc. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 493
F. Supp. 76, 77-78 (W.D. Mich. 1980)); see also Esquel Enters., Ltd. v. Misty Valley,
Inc., No. 85 Civ. 9885 (CSH), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10506, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6,
1987) ("'[C]osts,' in the usual use of the word in federal practice, means allowances
to a party for certain expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending an action...
and as a rule will not include attorney's fees."). See generally 10 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 17, § 2666, at 203 ("Typically costs are allowed in favor of the
winning party against the losing party to provide at least partial indemnification of
the expenses incurred in establishing the claim or defense.").
72 See Beverly Hills Design Studio (N.Y.) Inc. v. Morris, 126 F.R.D. 33, 37
(1989) ("When a defendant is statutorily entitled to attorneys' fees, it is consistent
that security may be required to cover them."); Amjon Publishers, Inc. v. Home Box
Office, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 4968 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1982) (granting HBO's motion for a
bond "because of the likelihood that HBO will prevail ... which under 17 U.S.C. §
505 may include reasonable attorneys' fees").
73 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
74 See 17 U.S.C. § 505.
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than
the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise
provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.
Id.
75 See Selletti v. Carey, 173 F.R.D. 96, 102-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (observing that,
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4. Description of a Motion for Security
In jurisdictions that focus on the factors set forth in section
II.B.2, the party moving for security for costs will typically
provide the court with proof that its adversary lacks substantial
assets within the court's jurisdiction so that a judgment of costs
and fees cannot be satisfied.76 In addition, the moving party will
attempt to demonstrate that its adversary's case lacks merit.77
Furthermore, motion papers typically provide justification for
the proposed amount of the bond.78 Some courts look to the
moving party's estimate of the length of discovery, number of
depositions, travel-time, and other costs to justify the proposed
amount of the bond.79
5. Constitutional Framework
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed the constitutionality of imposing security for costs
solely based upon the non-resident status of a plaintiff. Citing
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution,80 the United
States Courts of Appeals for the First and Second Circuits have
questioned the imposition of cost bonds solely based on a
plaintiffs non-resident status.8 ' Nevertheless, numerous district
courts provide for a mechanism of requiring non-residents to
post security for costs.8 2
pursuant to the Copyright Act, plaintiff may be liable for attorney fees, and
directing plaintiff to post a $50,000 bond); Beverly Hills Design Studio, 126 F.R.D.
at 36 (noting that defendant may be entitled to reasonable attorney fees, and
requiring plaintiff to post a $20,000 bond).
76 See Selletti, 173 F.R.D. at 101 ("[D]efendant's report that their search of the
public records maintained in the appropriate LEXIS computer database library
reveal that [plaintiffs] only identifiable asset is a parcel of land valued at $500.").
7 See id. at 101 (noting the defendant's contention that the plaintiff offered
nothing beyond speculation, and that plaintiff failed to allege any connection
between his composition and the defendant).
78 See id. (noting the defendants' reliance on the anticipated attorney fees as
justification for requesting a security bond in the amount of $250,000).
79 See Bressler v. Liebman, No. 96 Civ. 9310 (LAP), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11963, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1997) (stating that "the extent and scope of
discovery" is to be taken into consideration when considering a request for security
for costs); Lawford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 906, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(concluding that more than a nominal bond was warranted because of the costs
associated with taking depositions in Canada).
80 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (observing that requiring
security costs of foreign petitioners may violate the Equal Protection Clause).
82 See, e.g., Kreitzer v. Puerto Rico Cars, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 498, 502 n.2 (D.P.R.
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The Supreme Court has held that, in general, an individual
has a fundamental right of access to the courts.8 3 This right may
be curtailed, however, upon a showing of an overriding state
interest.8 4 In Boddie v. Connecticut,85 the Supreme Court struck
down a state law that required a party, despite being indigent, to
pay a filing fee to procure a divorce. 86 On several occasions,
however, courts have refrained from extending the right of
access to the courts beyond the facts of Boddie.87  Several
appellate courts have upheld the constitutionality of laws
requiring prisoners, proceeding in forma pauperis, to provide a
portion of their average monthly income toward filing fees.88
1975) (listing several district courts that require, through a local rule, a non-
residential plaintiff to post a bond); see also supra note 4 (citing federal district
courts, which through a local rule, require a non-resident plaintiff to post security).
8 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) ("[Dlue process requires,
at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance,
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process
must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.").
84 See id. at 379 (stating that "except for extraordinary situations where some
valid governmental interest is at stake," a person must be afforded a hearing before
being deprived of a significant property interest).
85 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
86 See Boddie at 380-81 (holding that the State's refusal to admit indigent
parties into its courts, the only method in Connecticut of obtaining a divorce, is "the
equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard... [and] a denial of due
process").
87 See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (distinguishing
Boddie, and holding that a court may charge a filing fee that might prevent an
indigent from making a voluntary bankruptcy petition on the ground that
alternative means exist for the debtor to adjust his legal relations with his
creditors); Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Unger, 32 F. Supp. 2d 144, 148-49 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (distinguishing Boddie on the ground that the defendant failed to
substantiate its insolvency); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation
Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights (pt. 1), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1180
("Judicial Monopoly... was conceived as the common element mandating for
divorce suitors... protection against exclusionary court fees.... ."). But see M.L.B. v.
S.L.J. 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (holding that Mississippi may not condition a
natural mother's right to appeal a parental status termination on the condition that
she pay record preparation fees).
88 See, e.g., Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
plaintiff's contention that a federal law requiring prisoners to pay a filing fee before
filing a lawsuit or proceeding with an appeal creates an unconstitutional barrier to
the courts); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that
"[tihe fee requirements placed on prisoners under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
do not deprive [prisoners] of adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the
courts); Lumbert v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 827 F.2d 257, 259-60 (7th Cir. 1987)
(distinguishing Boddie, and holding that requiring a prisoner to pay a $7.20 partial
filing fee is not unconstitutional).
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Courts have also upheld the constitutionality of injunctions
imposed to prevent litigants from filing nuisance suits.8 9 Indeed,
the First Circuit has refused to extend Boddie to invalidate a
court rule that requires security only from nondomicilary
plaintiffs.90
III. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT LAW OF REQUIRING SECURITY
A. Difficulties with the Current Practice
Is arranging for the satisfaction of a potential judgment of
costs and fees by requiring security a good thing? The answer is
yes and no. While there may be value in ascertaining a party's
ability to pay potential fees and costs in advance, the process
also raises problems. Most fundamentally, a bond requirement
solely for non-residents reflects a conflict between federal courts'
limited power to enforce a judgment and the principle of equality
among litigants. Litigation between a resident of the forum and
a non-resident is treated differently from litigation between two
residents of the forum. Indeed, the First and Second Circuits
have suggested that requiring a bond solely based on a litigant's
non-resident status violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.91
The practice of commenting upon the merits of a case also
presents a problem when such comments are made without a
hearing and prior to the close of discovery. If the court conditions
continued progress of the case upon posting of security, the
89 See, e.g., Lysiak v. Comm'r, 816 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(holding that a taxpayer's pattern of baseless litigation justified imposing
restrictions on his access to the court); Martin-Trigona v. Lavien, 737 F.2d 1254,
1261-62 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that, in light of the plaintiffs past history of time-
consuming, frivolous litigation, the district court was justified in issuing an
injunction prohibiting the plaintiff from bringing new actions without first
obtaining leave of the court); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(directing the district court to enter an order preventing a vexatious prisoner from
continuing to file suits without seeking leave of the court, certifying that the claims
he wishes to present have not been resolved before in any federal court).
90 See Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 144 (1st Cir.
1976).
91 See supra notes 36-37 (discussing equal protection problems); Hawes, 535
F.2d at 145 (holding that, while such a rule is not per se invalid, "to require all
foreign plaintiffs, as such, to post substantial security as a condition to access to the
courts may well be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection") (citation
omitted).
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impact upon the case is obvious: the plaintiff must post security
or face dismissal. Moreover, even without ordering the case to
be dismissed, the court may tacitly convince the plaintiff to
withdraw from prosecuting its claim by telegraphing the court's
views on the merits of the case. All this could occur without a
hearing and full discovery.
The impact of a court's comments on the merits of a claim
can be demonstrated with the use of an algebraic model. Let us
assume that a theoretical plaintiff expects a positive return on
his lawsuit. The plaintiff seeks recovery in an amount labeled A,
believes his or her probability of success is P, and has a projected
cost of litigation, including attorney fees, of C. First, assume
that the court requires the plaintiff to post a bond solely based
on the plaintiffs non-resident status-without commenting on
the merits of the case-and that the plaintiff will have to post a
bond in the amount B. The opportunity cost to the plaintiff of its
tying up this amount is Y. The plaintiff will prosecute its claim
ifPxA- ((100%- P) xB)-Y- C > 0. 92 If the plaintiff has
brought a lawsuit pursuant to a statute that provides for the
recovery of costs and attorney fees, the plaintiff will consider C
to approach zero if P is greater than 50%.93
On the other hand, assume that a court requires the
plaintiff to post a bond because, among other things, the court
finds that the plaintiffs claim appears to lack merit. Since the
court has now telegraphed its views on the plaintiffs case, the
plaintiff may consider P to approach zero. Under these
circumstances, the plaintiff will assume that it will not be able to
recover costs and attorney fees. P x A - ((100% - P) x B) - Y - C is
now less than zero and, therefore, the plaintiff is likely not to
proceed to prosecute its claim.
The fact that requiring such security may be a condition of
allowing the case to continue, or may cause a plaintiff to
withdraw the case, as demonstrated above, shows that the
repercussions of the security requirements are quite significant.
In light of the significant consequences of requiring a plaintiff to
92 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (explaining the "Reward Model" using
.economic analysis to develop optimal public and private policies to combat illegal
behavior").
93 This of course assumes, for the sake of simplicity, that there is no added
short-term detriment to the plaintiff of paying its costs, C, even if believes that C
will be recovered in the long term.
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post a bond and the lack of uniform procedure for imposing costs
bonds, courts are left with the task of finding a workable solution
that provides for the satisfaction of a judgment for costs and fees,
while ensuring that a plaintiff has the benefits of discovery and a
hearing prior to a determination on the merits of its case.
B. Abandoning Jurisdictional Limitations on the Collection of
Costs in Federal Court
The limited jurisdictional power of federal courts, pursuant
to Pennoyer and its progeny,94  has prompted several
commentators to suggest the benefits of expanded, or even
nationwide, service of process and subpoena power in federal
actions.9 5 As noted by several commentators, limited jurisdiction
in the federal court system was not an inevitable development,
particularly in light of the American concept of dual
sovereignty.9 6 Nevertheless, the notion that a state or federal
court may not extend its process beyond a limited territorial
area endures. 97
Extending the courts' power to enforce a judgment of costs
and fees in foreign jurisdictions presents one method of
eliminating the need for security for costs in most cases. A
judgment rendered in a federal district court in New York would
thus be received and enforced in California with the same
94 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (defining the boundaries of
personal jurisdiction).
95 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in all
Federal Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L.REv. 1117, 1117-19 (1989)
(noting the profound impact of nationwide personal jurisdiction in disentangling the
doctrines of personal jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens); Rhonda
Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REV. 37
(1989) (discussing ways in which states can expand the reach of their subpoena
power); Cathaleen A. Roach, It's Time to Change the Rule Compelling Witness
Appearance at Trial: Proposed Revisions to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e), 79
Geo. L.J. 81 (1990) (suggesting that the rule needs to be rewritten because of
developments in technology, such as the ability to testify via satellite).
96 See, e.g., 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1064 (providing a history of
personal jurisdiction in the United States); Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal,
and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62
WASH L. REV. 479, 511 (1987) (stating that the Supreme Court's explanations of
personal jurisdiction rules have been "brief and inadequate").
97 See Perdue, supra note 96, at 511 ("[Jlurisdiction represents an assertion of
state authority and state authority is inherently territorially limited."); Wasserman,
supra note 95, at 91 (discussing why state legislatures have not authorized their
courts to assert extraterritorial subpoena power despite that "one would have
expected" them to do so).
[Vol.74:953
SECURITY FOR COSTS AND FEES
efficiency, and in the same manner, as a judgment rendered in
California. Therefore, abandoning jurisdictional limitations on
the ability to enforce a judgment for costs would lower the risk of
a premature determination of the merits that could arise in a
determination on whether security was appropriate, and avoid
the necessity of a separate action in a foreign jurisdiction to
enforce a judgment for costs and fees.
C. Elimination/Modification of Consideration of the Merits
from Security Determination
An alternative approach to ameliorate some of the
shortcomings of the current practice of requiring security for
costs would require reasonable security for costs from all non-
resident plaintiffs, except those financially unable to post
security.98 If reasonably valued bonds were required of all non-
resident plaintiffs, judicial determinations of the merits of a
claim to determine whether security was appropriate would be
unnecessary.
Additionally, courts should consider modifying the manner
in which they examine the merits of an action in the context of a
motion for security for costs and fees. Upon a motion for
significant security, a judicial determination of the merits of a
claim should not be made without a court hearing. Furthermore,
the courts could postpone considering the merits of a claim until
the parties have been afforded a reasonable amount of discovery.
Where, however, the litigant's claim has already been dismissed
in a prior lawsuit and a full record has been established, such as
in the case of a clearly vexatious litigant, the court might
eliminate the prerequisite of additional discovery.
CONCLUSION
Security for costs is a common and often significant aspect of
civil litigation in the federal district courts. English courts
began requiring security in the late eighteenth century, and this
practice continued in the United States to ensure that plaintiffs
would satisfy potential judgments for costs. As the law in this
98 Indeed, the First Circuit has emphasized that instead of requiring all foreign
plaintiffs to post security, a trial court should in each case determine whether the
plaintiff is unable to post security for costs and exercise its discretion accordingly.
See Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 145 (1st Cir. 1976).
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area developed in the United States, courts began conditioning a
requirement that a plaintiff post security upon the relative
merits of the plaintiffs underlying claims.
The subject of requiring security for costs and fees has not
been addressed by commentators. Is arranging for the
satisfaction of a potential judgment of costs and fees by requiring
security a good thing? As has been pointed out, the answer is
yes and no. As discussed above, the courts have understandably
found value in ascertaining a party's ability to pay potential fees
and costs in advance. However, the process also raises problems.
First, the courts have not adequately addressed the fairness of
considering and discussing the merits of the plaintiffs case at a
relatively early stage of the litigation. Second, the courts have
not resolved the issue of whether it is fair to require security
solely based on a litigant's residence, or whether security is
precisely necessary to ensure the ability to enforce a judgment of
costs and fees against non-residents to the same extent as
against residents.
Extending the courts' power to enforce a judgment of costs
and fees in foreign jurisdictions would, in many instances,
eliminate the need for security. Alternatively, upon a motion for
security, courts should conduct a hearing regarding the merits of
the claims after the parties have been afforded a reasonable
amount of discovery so that a full record may be established
before a bond is required.
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